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ABSTRACT 
Mental health services in the UK are now predominantly community-based, rather than inpatient-
based. Managing patients with suicidal risk within the community setting is challenging and 
suicides from those currently using or having recently used these services do occur. More than half 
of the people who commit suicide have visited their doctor in the month before their death. In 
current practice within the UK health service, patient suicides are investigated as serious incidents 
and analysed using Root Cause Analysis (RCA) but this method has limitations in exploring deep 
system problems. This study reanalysed 41 of these RCA incident reports using Systems Theoretic 
Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP). The analysis revealed the weaknesses within the 
system safety control structure and the themes around those control flaws. An inherent weakness in 
the control structure is the need to monitor the patient’s risk without constant observation and 
relying on the patient to report issues and adhere to their treatment plan. Patient engagement issues 
are a major theme with loss of control and feedback on the patient status due to their lack of 
willingness to engage with services and treatment options. In some cases, patients have presented at 
a time of crisis but then declined the crisis support or inpatient treatment offered to them. Patients 
new to services present a problem where decisions on their care have to be made with limited 
knowledge of the patient. Certain coordination and communication issues between the 
multidisciplinary teams and multiple services are also found. In this study, STAMP application 
enabled effective aggregation of multiple incident analysis and system-wide remedial action 
prioritisation. 
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Introduction 
Over the past 30 years mental health care has significantly changed with a transition from an 
institution-based care model to a predominantly community-based care model (Gilburt et al., 2014). 
Many community-based mental health patients are at risk of suicide with clinical risk assessments 
used to assess the balance between the benefits of community care and the patient’s safety. Suicide 
rates among patients of community-based crisis resolution home treatment teams are higher (14.6 
per 10,000 episodes) than those receiving inpatient care (8.8 per 10,000 hospital admissions) in 
England between 2003 and 2011 (Hunt et al., 2014). Within UK National Health Service (NHS) 
community-based mental health care completed patient suicides are treated as serious incidents and 
investigated accordingly. In current practice, Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is used to analyse these 
incidents and make recommendations to prevent similar events occurring in the future. 
However, RCA tends to conceptualise incidents as a linear causal chain of events and its limitations 
are well documented within the field of safety science (Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2004; 
Rasmussen, 1990). An alternative approach to analysing incidents is through understanding them as 
emergent properties arising from uncontrolled relationships between a system’s constituent parts 
(Leveson, 2004; Salmon et al, 2011; Underwood, 2012). One of the alternative approaches, 
Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP) models the hierarchical safety 
control structure present in the system to enforce safety constraints and looks for weaknesses with 
inadequate enforcement of safety constraints or issues with feedback on system status (Leveson, 
2012). The aim of this study is to analyse suicide incident reports using STAMP to understand 
suicide incidents and the related safety control structure in place and make recommendations for 
suicide prevention.  
Method 
A total of 41 suicide incident reports from 2015 and 2016 in a large NHS mental health trust in 
England were reviewed and analysed using STAMP following the approach described by Leveson 
(2012). Out of a total of 43 suicide incident reports, 41 were selected since the other two did not 
concern patients that had care provided by community mental health services (community mental 
health teams, crisis resolution and home treatment teams, and psychological services). 
The main services and teams relevant to the analysis are: 
i) community mental health team which is made up of psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, 
clinical psychologists, occupational therapists, support workers and psychological services. 
They provide long-term community care and are split into specialisms for children and 
adolescents, adults, and older people. 
ii) crisis response team which includes crisis resolution and home treatment teams and mental 
health professionals working at emergency departments, police stations and in triage 
vehicles. These teams assess and treat patients during periods of crisis as an alternative to 
inpatient care.   
The suicide incident reports had been conducted by senior mental health professionals with Root 
Cause Analysis used as the analytical approach. They were on average 26 pages in length. 
Prior to the STAMP incident analysis, a 60-minute interview was conducted with a crisis response 
service manager to gain an overview of operations. The STAMP analysis was then conducted by 
one ergonomics researcher, the analysis and findings were discussed in two 60-minute sessions 
with a second researcher until the output was agreed upon. The safety control structure (Figure 1) 
produced in the STAMP analysis was then validated in a 60-minute group session with the crisis 
response service manager and two community mental health service managers. 
Results 
The processes involved in suicide prevention were modelled as a safety control structure (Figure 1). 
The model identifies the controllers that influence the system and the control-feedback loops that 
enable them to change and receive information on the system and patient status. Weak feedback can 
result in a controller having an incorrect understanding of the system state, which can impact on 
their ability to make decisions. Controls can be weak and ineffective in changing the system to the 
desired state. The main weaknesses in the safety control structure were identified as: 
1) An inherent weakness in the control-feedback loop in the necessity to understand and predict 
behaviour in patients with dynamic risk when they are not under constant observation. 
2) Issues with patient engagement resulting in the clinician losing feedback on patient status and 
reducing effectiveness of controls from issues with patient adherence to treatment plans. 
3) Treatment controls being medically indicated but not fitting the patient’s desires and thus 
declined. 
4) Patients new to services (with two or less appointments), so that decisions are made without a 
substantial body of knowledge on the patient. 
5) Communication and coordination issues within the care process. 
The control structure in Figure 1 contains downwards arrows showing the controls, a reference 
channel with the information necessary to impose safety constraints on the level below, and 
upwards arrows that show the feedback, a measuring channel with feedback returned up the 
hierarchy on how effectively safety constraints are being imposed (Leveson, 2015). 
The analysis searched for weaknesses in the feedback channel and considered four main types of 
hazardous control actions (Leveson, 2012): 
- Control actions necessary to enforce safety constraint are not given (control action not 
given). 
- The necessary control actions were provided too early or too late (incorrect timing). 
- Unsafe control actions were provided (unsafe control action given). 
- Control action stops too soon or is applied too long (incorrect duration). 
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Figure 1: Safety control structure 
1) Inherent weakness controlling a dynamic risk in community environment 
There is an inherent weakness in the control structure in patients having freedom in the community. 
This limits feedback with patients not under constant observation and places responsibility on the 
patient to adhere to treatment plans. Table 1 displays the cases where patients have committed 
suicide without a change in their status being detected.  
Table 1: Difficulties in detecting change in patient status 
Feedback Last contact Service 
No concerns raised during previous visits 1 month Crisis response and community team 
Patient felt mood had improved and no 
longer in crisis 
1 week Recently discharged from crisis 
response 
Nothing remarkable detected in recent 
appointments 
1 month Community team: nurse-led clinic 
Planned to continue with talking therapy 5 days Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPT)  
Last seen by GP 
Regular contact with key worker for 11 
months 
10 days Children and adolescent services  
Had received therapy and was continuing 
follow-up 
5 days Children and adolescent services 
Had settled since initial presentation with 
11 subsequent appointments 
1 day Crisis response for home treatment 
Reviews every 3 months 
Presented with a similar pattern 
22 days Community team 
Weekly visits 9 days Assertive outreach team 
Patient felt stable 2 days Community team Discharged from 
inpatients 
Review every 6 months 
Patient stable 
4 months Community team 
Residential care home  
Daily visits 1 day Crisis response 
Weekly telephone assessments and home 
visits 
6 days Children and adolescent outpatient 
services 
Carer had raised concerns 
Assessment by CPN did not identify 
relapse indicators 
2 days Community team 
Recently discharged from inpatients 
Regular visits 8 days Community team for older people 
Regular reviews and visits 2 days Community team for older people 
No contact after discharge 5 months Not open to services 
Discharged from community team 
 
2) Patient engagement issues 
One major theme in the incident reports that weakens both feedback on patient status to the 
clinician and the effectiveness of treatment controls is poor patient engagement. Eleven of the 
reports noted significant patient engagement issues, as shown in Table 2. This includes non-
attendance at appointments, declined medical advice and non-adherence to treatment.  
Table 2: Patient engagement issues 
Patient engagement issues Last contact Service 
Non-attendance 6 months Community team 
Non-attendance and requested discharge 6 months Not open to services 
Last seen by crisis response at 
Emergency Department (ED) 
Non-attendance 1 day Community team 
Last seen by crisis response triage 
vehicle 
Poor engagement  
Discontinuation of medication  
Declined support from alcohol services 
1 week Community team 
Non-attendance 3 weeks Community team 
Last seen by police station Mental 
Health Professional 
Non-attendance 1 week Community team 
Patient declined crisis support 
Only consistently engaged during times of 
crisis 
6 days Community team 
Only engaged during periods of 
crisis 
History of poor engagement with services 1 day Not open to services 
Last seen by crisis response 
Did not engage with personality disorder 
service after referral 
11 days Community team 
Last seen by crisis response at police 
station 
Continued substance abuse 12 days Community team 
Continued substance abuse 
Non-attendance 
2 days Forensic community team 
 
3) Patient declines crisis and inpatient support 
Four of the reports note that the patient recently presented in a period of crisis but did not receive 
crisis support or inpatient treatment. In these cases (Table 3), the patients are not admissible under 
the Mental Health Act and have declined crisis and inpatient treatment or agreed to continued home 
support from the community team.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Crisis and inpatient support not utilised 
Circumstance Last contact Service 
Patient declines crisis and inpatient 
support 
Family insist can provide home care 
1 day Community team 
Last assessed by crisis response triage 
car after being spotted by police at 
railway 
MHA assessment conducted, not 
admissible  
Patient declines admission 
7 days Community team 
Last assessed at emergency department 
Patient declines out of area inpatient 
service 
1 day Last seen by crisis response at ED 
Not open to services 
Presented to urgent care after an overdose 
but denied having suicidal plans or intent 
8 days 
1 day GP 
appointment 
Assessed by crisis response at urgent 
care 
Not open to services, previously 
discharged from community team 
 
4) Patient new to service, recent handover or awaiting appointment 
There were cases of patients not yet assessed by the service they were to enter before the suicide 
incident or having had few appointments - in seven cases the service had two or less appointments 
with the patient prior to the incident, as displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4: Patient new to service 
Number of contacts Last contact Service 
Awaiting first appointment 10 days First assessment by crisis response  
Referred to community team 
1 assessment 3 months Community team 
First appointment 
1 telephone assessment 6 weeks IAPT following discharge from crisis 
response 
1 assessment 10 days Community team for older people 
Presented to GP and urgent care while on 
waiting list 
2 days  Awaiting start with community team 
Last assessed by crisis response 
2 appointments with community team 1 day GP 
1 month 
community 
team 
Community team 
2 appointments with community team 
MHA assessment on second appointment 
3 days Community team 
5) Communication, coordination and process issues 
Coordination between controllers is critical where care is provided by multidisciplinary teams and 
changes in patient status result in changes to service provision. Examples of coordination and 
communication issues include: staff sick leave, differences in electronic record keeping between 
services, administration issues in referrals and lack of required service expertise resulting in 
disrupted care. These cases are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Communication and coordination issues 
Control structure weakness Last contact Service 
Disruption to care from staff sick leave 2 months Community team and crisis response 
early discharge planning 
Potential gaps in care with record 
keeping issue 
2 months Community team 
Disruption to care from staff sick leave 
Change in patient status did not trigger 
change in service provision 
6 months IAPT service 
No consistent support for personality 
disorders at inpatient care 
Gaps in communication between 
services and patient family 
6 days Community team and crisis response 
early discharge planning 
No access to electronic patient records 6 weeks IAPT and GP 
Electronic system did not contain 
comprehensive risk assessment template 
10 days Community mental health services for 
older people and GP 
Referral to psychotherapy services not 
sent 
8 days Community team but not open to 
services at time of incident 
 
Discussion 
STAMP facilitated a systematic analysis of aggregated RCA suicide reports and revealed 
community mental healthcare to be a challenging environment to monitor and control suicidal risk. 
STAMP was effective at gaining an understanding of system weaknesses and the difficulties 
clinicians face in identifying and acting upon suicidal risk, by modelling the wider system and 
considering human decision-making within system constraints, 
With finite resources and patient freedom, clinicians often make decisions based on irregular 
assessments with limited and ambiguous information. These inherent difficulties in observing, 
predicting and controlling human behaviour fit with the ultra-adaptive safety model described by 
Vincent and Amalberti (2016). This approach to safety is associated with work systems where 
seeking exposure to risk is inherent in the activity (Vincent and Amalberti, 2016). This is seen in 
community mental health care, where a patient’s risk of suicide is potentially increased by not 
having them institutionalised, for the benefit of their quality of life and wellbeing in living less 
disrupted lives in the community. Within the ultra-adaptive approach to healthcare safety, risk 
management is achieved through giving power to experts. This involves peer-to-peer learning, 
acquiring experience, understanding individuals’ limitations and increasing individual capacity to 
respond to demanding situations (Vincent and Amalberti, 2016).  
Adaptation is a consideration in general system safety, beyond healthcare. An organisation’s 
resilience can be considered in terms of ‘the ability of systems to prevent or adapt to changing 
conditions in order to maintain control over a system property’ (Leveson et al., 2016). The systems 
analysis has identified weaknesses in the community mental healthcare system’s ability to adapt to 
patient engagement issues and patients presenting in crisis but declining the support offered. The 
issues with patient engagement suggest the services: struggle to adapt to patient behaviour and 
need; and may not have the capacity to do so. Community teams have a strict Did Not Attend 
policy which can result in patient discharge and may not suit those patients with severe engagement 
issues. 
To have adaptive capacity in a system such as community mental health, buffers would need to be 
built into the system, with extra capacity available when needed. This capacity may not be utilised 
consistently but would be kept for demanding situations such as patients turning up in crisis at 
emergency departments. A bed, observation and psychological help could then be provided at the 
point of contact, rather than assessment and referral to another team and location. The same can be 
said for long-term care in community teams, where a change in patient status can result in offers of 
referral to crisis support or inpatient services. This is sometimes declined and there is a question as 
to whether continuing support in a bed space within the same team and environment the patient is 
used to is more appealing to the patient. Along with political pressures and austerity measures, there 
is a current uptake of lean philosophy in UK healthcare but it is not clear if lean thinking can 
include the concept of adaptive capacity.   
Certainly, patient engagement and service design is a huge area deserving of further research. 
Within community mental health services engagement is a known issue and efforts are made to deal 
with these problems. But there are conflicting trade-offs in being patient-centred and using 
resources most effectively. Designing services to fit with the needs of patients with a range of 
diagnoses including personality disorders, psychosis and mood disorders is challenging. And there 
is variation in need beyond medical diagnosis, with differences in home, family, employment and 
social behaviour.    
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